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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guardian
ad Litem, Gaylen R Olsen,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COMMISSION; and FLOWELL ELECTRICAL ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13867

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COMMISSION,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC,
.; Third-Party Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, STATE OF UTAH
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action seeking recovery of
damages for bodily injury suffered in a construction
accident which occurred in the course of Appellant's
employment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable
GL Hal Taylor presiding, granted summary judgment
in favor of Respondent, Flowell Electrical Association,
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no cause of action. Later, the District Court, Honorable
Maurice Harding presiding, granted summary judgment
in favor of Respondent, State of Utah, no cause of
action.

BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, State of Utah, seeks affirmance of the
judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant has failed to accurately and fully
state the undisputed facts and, therefore, a restatement
of the facts is necessary.
This action arose out of an accident that occurred
on September 6, 1972, near Meadow, Utah, during the
construction of a section of Interstate Highway 15.
Appellant, a laborer employed by Cox Construction
Company, was assisting the pouring of cement on a
bridge deck from a large steel bucket suspended from
the cable of a crane when the supporting cables of the
boom contacted an overhead power line owned by the
Flowell Electrical Association. An electrical charge of
14,400 volts was transmitted to the bucket causing serious
injuries to the Appellant.
A week prior to the accident, Brent Cox, the superintendent of the Cox Construction Company, contacted
Flowell Electrical officials to review the construction
site and to make arrangements for de-energizing the
power line located approximately 29 feet above the bridge
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deck where the cement pour was to proceed. [Cox Deposition, pp. 13, 21]. Ralph Robinson, a Flowell Electrical
Association employee, inspected the site and informed
Cox that the power line serviced several customers and
requested that, if possible, the pour be arranged to avoid
interruption of power. [Cox Deposition, pp. 16, 21].
Brent Cox advised Robinson that cement could be delivered to the site with a concrete pump, rather than a
crane, thus eliminating the need to terminate power.
[Cox Deposition, p. 15]. Since the cement pump was to
be used, no arrangements for terminating power were
made and Robinson asked Cox to notify the power company if he "needed any help." [Cox Deposition, p. 15].
Cox agreed to notify Flowell if terminating power became necessary. [Cox Deposition, p. 15, 21-22].
On the day of the accident, Cox attempted to use a
concrete pump specifically ordered for the job, but the
pump failed to function properly. [Cox Deposition, pp.
30, 31]. Cox ordered the 40 ton crane moved into the area
while he drove to Fillmore, a distance of approximately
15 miles, to contact Ralph Robinson to request cutting
electrical power. [Cox Deposition, p. 32]. He was unable
to contact Robinson, or any other Flowell employees, and
he returned without making arrangements with the power
company. [Cox Deposition, p. 32].
In Cox's absence, the employees began using the
crane to deliver cement to the north side of the bridge
deck away from the power line. [Cox Deposition, p. 35].
A large steel cement bucket suspended by cable from the
boom was used for this purpose. When Cox returned, he
3
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supervised the completion of the pour on the north side
and then ordered the crane moved to the south side near
the overhead electrical wire. [Cox Deposition, p. 36].
Cox remained on the scene to directly supervise the
total concrete operation and to observe the movement of
the crane. [Cox Deposition, p. 37]. Cognizant of the
nearby electrical wire, he continuously spoke with the
crane operator concerning the movement of the crane
boom. [Cox Deposition, p. 68]. The Appellant and a
fellow employee, Darwin Jensen, positioned the cement
bucket for each pour by using hand signals. [Cox Deposition, p. 39],
Just prior to the accident, Brent Cox instructed the
Appellant and Jensen to pour one more bucket in the
same position as the previous load and ordered them not
to direct the crane boom any closer to the overhead
power line. [Cox Deposition, pp. 68-70]. The accident
occurred when the Appellant and his fellow employee
directed the final bucket of cement into position and the
crane boom or supporting cable brushed against the high
voltage wire.
The only State employee present at the construction
site at the time of the accident was Franklin Drew Easmussen. The State of Utah by its Road Commission had
engaged Cox Construction Company for construction of
this section of interstate highway. Easmussen was a
laboratory technician assigned to the project to insure
that concrete was poured in accordance with quality and
design specifications. [Easmussen Deposition, p. 48].
Contrary to Appellant's assertion, Easmussen was not
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a safety inspector and did not have authority to dictate
construction procedures. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 8,
11-12]. If he observed unsafe practices, his duty and
authority was limited to alerting the contractor or state
inspectors. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 11-12].
Approximately 20 minutes before the accident, Easmussen testified that he became concerned because the
boom of the crane appeared to be maneuvering too close
to the power line. Easmussen expressed this concern to
Brent Cox. Cox notified the crane operator to move the
crane, which was done. [Easmussen Deposition, p. 24],
Approximately 15 minutes later, Easmussen noticed the
boom was again too close to the wire and he again notified Brent Cox. Cox requested Easmussen to advise the
crane operator to move the boom away from the wire and
Easmussen did so. [Easmussen Deposition, pp. 24-25].
Easmussen then returned to his truck to complete a test
he was conducting. The crane operator did not move the
crane, but continued the pour, intending to move it after
he dumped one more bucket. [Easmussen Deposition, p.
25].
Because the Appellant was injured in the course and
scope of his employment with Cox Construction Company, he has received Workmen's Compensation payments incident to his injuries.
The Appellant's claim against the State of Utah
rests upon two claims. First, Appellant alleges the Industrial Commission violated a duty imposed by Sec.
35-1-16(1), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, to supervise every
place of employment. Second, Appellant contends the
5
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Road Commission employee negligently failed to direct
and supervise the construction work undertaken by Cox
Construction Company.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the State of Utah because the Appellant failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court held
that neither the Industrial Commission nor the Road
Commission violated any duty upon which an award of
damages can rest. Moreover, if any duty did exist, the
Workmen's Compensation Act bars any recovery by this
Appellant against the State. Finally, as a matter of law,
the negligence of the Appellant's employer was the sole
proximate cause of the accident.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE OF UTAH OWED NO DUTY
TO THE APPELLANT UPON WHICH AN
AWARD OF DAMAGES CAN BE BASED.
A. The Industrial Commission's general duty
to supervise places of employment and to enforce
safety regulations cannot be the basis for civil
liability.
Appellant contends the State of Utah is liable for
damages on the theory that the Industrial Commission
breached a duty to supervise his employer and to enforce
safety regulations. The Appellant relies on Sec. 35-116(1), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which states:
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall
have full power, jurisdiction and authority:
(1) to supervise every employment and place
of employment and to administer and
enforce all laws for the protection of the
life, health, safety and welfare of employees.
In support of his contention, Appellant cites Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972), where
the Court held that an architect did not have a duty to
insure that employees of contractors were furnished with
a safe place to work. In dicta, the Court mentioned that
such a duty lies with the Industrial Commission.
Appellant cites no case where a general duty to enforce laws for public health and safety has formed a basis
for civil liability. Indeed, contrary to Appellant's contention, it is well established that statutes imposing a
general duty for the benefit of the public do not create
any right or discernible standard of care upon which
civil liability can be determined.
In Kirk v. United States, 270 F. 2d 110, (9th Cir.
1959), a case closely analogous to the instant suit, the
court sustained a summary judgment for the defendant
because no actionable duty to enforce safety regulations
existed. In Kirk, plaintiffs brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful death of a carpenter who fell to his death from a scaffolding during construction of a dam located on federal property. The deceased was an employee of an independent contractor engaged in the construction of the dam. The plaintiffs al-
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leged the Army Corps of Engineers had a duty to enforce
safety standards prescribed by Army regulations. The
United States was represented on the project by inspectors whose duty it was to see that the contractor complied
with all safety provisions. When the plaintiff fell, there
were no safety nets under the scaffolding and no ropes or
buoys in or near the area as the safety standards required. As a result, the deceased plunged into the river
below the work area.
The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs
had a civil remedy against the government merely because it had breached a duty prescribed by statute, regulations, manuals and directives to conduct a continuous
and comprehensive accident prevention and rescue program. The Court held:
The general rule is that a statute which does not
purport to establish a civil liability, but merely
makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of
the public as an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability. 50 Am. Jur.
582, Statutes, §586. 270 F.2d at 117.
In Kirk, the statute under consideration did not define a degree of care imposed on the Army in the exercise
of its general duty to promulgate and enforce safety regulations. In the absence of a legislatively defined standard of care, the Court correctly concluded that Congress
did not intend to create a duty, the violation of which,
could give rise to civil liability. The Court reasoned:
Every Government employee must trace the duties
of his job to some law, regulation, or order, but
this does not mean that in every such case there
is thereby established a duty of care on the part of
8
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the employee and the Government toward those
who may be incidentally benefitted if those duties
are properly performed, or toward those who
may be incidentally injured if those duties are not
properly performed. Id. at 118 (Citations
omitted.)
Similarly, in United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28 (10th
Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 979, an action was
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful death of an employee of Hercules Powder Company
who was killed in an explosion at Bacchus, Utah, during
experiments with solid fuel rocket propellants. The
government engaged Hercules as an independent contractor for research and development purposes in connection with an experimental fuel. As in Kirk, government officers were charged with the duty of overseeing
the contractor to insure that it performed its duties in
accordance with safety regulations. An Air Force officer
who had the title of "Safety Engineer," was assigned to
the project whose duty it was to "monitor" the contractor's safety performance.
The trial court found that the government employees
were negligent because they did not properly supervise
the industrial safety practices of the contractor, did not
prescribe additional safety practices and did not properly
inspect the government property as to safety. The Circuit
Court reversed the trial court decision with a direction
to dismiss the case. The Court held that the safety regulations imposed no duty upon the government which
could be the basis of creating civil liability for injuries
suffered by employees of the independent contractor. The
Court stated:
9
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Hercules had the primary responsibility for the
safety of its employees; it had the direct control
and supervision over them, and they were working in its plant. Further, it had the duty to perform and supervise the individual functions, the
total of which produced the end product. . . . It
and the safety of those then working was under
the exclusive control and supervision of Hercules.
The safety program of the government did not
constitute an exercise of any such control. The
fact that the activity may be dangerous has no
consequences on this issue. 350 F.2d at 31.

As in Kirk and Page, the statute upon which Appellant relies in the present case defines a mere general duty for the benefit of the public as an entity. The
statute does not impose a standard of performance upon
which liability may be determined. In the absence of
an expressed intention in the statute to create civil
liability, and without a discernible standard of care imposed by legislative mandate, the statute cannot be construed to grant individual employees a cause of action
against the Industrial Commission.
The importance of the distinction between a general
duty to the public upon which civil liability may not
be based, and a specific duty with a discernible standard of care is made apparent by viewing statutes analogous to the one at issue in this case. Section 27-10-4,
U.C.A., 1953 as amended, states that it shall be the
duty of the State Highway Patrol to enforce the laws
and rules and regulations of the State governing the
use of the State highways. The presence of a highway
patrolman to discover and abate every violation of every
10
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safety rule of the highway would clearly benefit motorists. Nevertheless, a motorist injured by a speeding vehicle may not maintain a right to recover damage from
the State because a patrolman did not happen to be
present to discover the violation in time to halt it.
To the contrary, the primary duty to obey highway safety regulations lies with each motorist notwithstanding the general duty of the Highway Patrol to
enforce compliance. In the instant case, the actionable
duty to provide a safe place of employment and to heed
safety procedures lies with the employer and not with
the Industrial Commission.
In addition to recognized rules of statutory construction, sound public policy requires rejection of the
Appellant's argument. The statute upon which Appellant relies charges the Industrial Commission with the
general duty of supervising every employment and place
of employment to enforce all laws for the protection
of employees. If a specific duty arising by virtue of
this statute is owed to each employee upon which liability may rest, the presence of an inspector would be
required at the side of each employee on every single
job. The legislature could not have intended to create
a cause of action for failing to perform such an impossible task.
Finally, even if Sec. 35-1-16, TJ.C.A. 1953, as
amended, sets forth a discernible duty of care to which
the Industrial Commission is bound, subsequent provisions of Utah law clearly limit the extent to which the
11
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State is liable to injured employees. Sec. 35-3-1, U.C.A.
1953, as amended, establishes the State Insurance Fund
as the exclusive means by which the State will be liable
for employment related injuries. That statute expressly
states: "There shall be no liability on the part of the
State beyond the amount of such fund.''
Thus, if the Industrial Commission fails to exercise the requisition degree of care in its enforcement
of safety regulations, the State is liable only to the
extent of Workmen's Compensation benefits. If the Appellant relies on a duty created by statute, the extent
of the liability created thereby may also be limited by
statute. The legislature has clearly done so in cases of
this nature.
Because the Appellant does not allege that the Industrial Commission committed any acts of affirmative
negligence, and, in any event, since his action is precluded by statute, he fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Consequently, this Court should
affirm the judgment of the court below.
B. The State Road Commission owed no duty
to the Appellant upon which liability may be based.
In Utah, and throughout the country, courts have
uniformly held that an employer is not liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor that causes injury to the contractor's employee. Prosser, Law of
Torts, §70 (1964); Restatement of Torts 2d, §409; 57
C.J.S., Master and Servant, §610 (1948). An employer
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owes to the servant of an independent contractor the
duty to avoid endangering him by his own negligence
or affirmative act, but owes no duty to protect him from
the negligence of his own master.
The general rule negating the Appellant's claim
against the Eoad Commission in this case has long been
recognized in Utah. In Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277,
148 P. 408, (1914), the plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor, brought suit against the owner
of the property upon which the plaintiff was working
pursuant to a subcontract agreement for construction
of a tunnel. The plaintiff alleged that the owner of the
property and the contractors for the project negligently
overlooked a buried explosive which discharged injuring
him. The owner of the property in its agreement with
the contractor reserved the right to see that the work
was done properly, but did not reserve the right to
supervise, direct or control the methods or means by
which the work was accomplished. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim against the employer-landowner, the Supreme
Court stated:
We think, therefore, that the case comes within
the general rule that when a person employs a
contractor to do work lawful in itself and involving no injurious consequences to others, and damage arises to another through the negligence of
the contractor or his servants, the contractor, and
not the employer, is liable. We think the ruling
right. 148 P. at 412.
More recently, in Stevens v. Colorado Fuel and Iron,
24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3 (1970), an action closely
analogous to the instant case, a suit was brought for
13
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wrongful death on the claim of a breach of duty to
inspect and make safe places where men worked. The
defendant was the owner of a mining claim who had
contracted with the deceased's employer for the loading of ore on the property. The plaintiff based his
claim on the theory that the defendant had a duty to
inspect work for safety and that this duty extended to
employees of contractors. The Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
and said :
Plaintiffs are confronted with a dilemma. If (the
contractor) were an agent subject to the super1 ;
vision and control of the defendant, defendant
i
would be an employer (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.
1953) and under Section 35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953,
the compensation awarded under the Workmen's
Compensation Act would be the exclusive remedy.
If [the contractor 1 were an independent contrac1
tor, the dangerous condition which allegedly
caused Stevens' death would not be subject to the
supervision and control of defendant. 469 P.2d
at 4-5.
The Appellant in the instant case is presented with
the same dilemma. If he alleges that Cox Construction
Company, his employer, was an independent contractor
and thus the Road Commission was a third person
against whom recovery may be sought, then, by definition, the State Road Commission could not exercise sufficient control over Appellant's employer to be liable
for its negligence in the performance of the construction
work. On the other hand, in order for Appellant to support his claim that the Road Commission owed him a
duty to inspect and supervise the work, he must con14
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cede that Cox Construction Company was not an independent contractor and thus his action is barred by
Sec. 35-1-60, XJ.C.A. 1953, as amended, because Workmen's Compensation is his exclusive remedy.
The Appellant attempts to avoid this dilemma by
claiming the Road Commission violated a duty that
did not arise out of the employment relationship between the Commission and Cox Construction Company.
Appellant argues that the Road Commission employee,
Drew Rasmussen, assumed a duty upon which recovery
may be based because he voluntarily attempted to warn
the crane operator of danger. In support of this con*
tention, Appellant cites Restatement of Torts, 2d, §§323
and 324A, which states that one who undertakes to render services for the protection of another is liable when
he fails to exercise reasonable care, if:
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care wcreases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of
the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
The State does not challenge the validity of this
"Hornbook tort law," but the undisputed facts clearly
demonstrate that Appellant's theory is not applicable
in this case. In any event, the legislature has barred
any recovery on such a theory by making Workmen's
Compensation the Appellant's sole remedy.
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The Appellant does not allege that Road Commission employee Drew Rasmussen committed any affirmative acts of negligence. Rather, Appellant contends
Rasmussen should have either stopped the crane operator or continued his supervision of the operation of
the crane. (Appellant's Brief, p. 24). At no time did
Rasmussen ever "supervise" the operation of the crane
or undertake to do so. By merely warning Brent Cox,
and, at Cox's request, asking the crane operator to
move the crane, Rasmussen clearly did not increase any
hazard. He merely acted under Cox's direction. The
undisputed facts also show that the operator failed to
heed these warnings to move away from the wire and,
therefore, no harm was suffered because of reliance
upon Rasmussen's actions. Quite to the contrary, the
Appellant was injured because his fellow employee failed
to rely upon these warnings.
Finally, if Rasmussen's actions were "undertaken
to perform a duty owned by the other [employer] to
the third person [employee]," Appellant's sole remedy
is Workmen's Compensation. Sec. 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953,
as amended, states:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained
by the employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer. . . . (Emphasis added).
This Court has consistently and uniformly held that
voluntary assumption of supervisory functions has been
held to create an employer-employee relationship barring recovery irrespective of the prior relationship be16
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tween the parties. Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948); Parkinson v.
Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136
(1946); Luker Sand and Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (1933); Utah Fire
Clay Co. v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d
183 (1935); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 1020 (1961); Stevens
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3
(1970); Doyle v. Facilities, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 41, 504 P.2d
1006 (1972).
Consequently, since the Appellant's only theory of
liability against the State Road Commission fails because no facts support its application and because liability is precluded by statute, the Court should affirm
the judgment of the court below.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST THE
STATE OF UTAH IS BARBED BY THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
Appellant contends that the Industrial Commission
and the State Road Commission violated a duty to protect him against any unsafe procedures employed by
Cox Construction Company. Whether this alleged duty
to protect him arises by statute or by voluntarily undertaking to act for his benefit, the Appellant's claim
is nevertheless barred by the Workmen's Compensation
Act because the State of Utah would be an employer
and its agents would be the Appellant's co-employees or
supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
17
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This Court has consistently held that the right to
exercise control over the manner in which work is executed is the hallmark of the employer's status within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Any
acts of negligence by State employees within the course
and scope of their employment undertaken to control
or supervise the construction work would be acts of the
State in an employer capacity.
Sec. 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, states:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained
by an employee . . . shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer. . . . (Emphasis added).
The Workmen's Compensation Act defines "employer " in Sec. 35-1-42, as follows:
The following shall constitute employers subject
to the provisions of this title:
(1) The State and each county, city, town
and school district therein,
*

#

#

Where an employer procures any work to be
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and such work is a part or process in the trade
or business of the employer, such contractor, and
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the
meaning of this section, employees of such original employer.... (Emphasis added.)
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Consequently, if, as Appellant alleges, the State of
Utah procured work to be done by the Cox Construction
Company over which the State retained or exercised
supervision or control, then the Cox Construction Company and all its employees, including the Appellant,
were employees of the State within the meaning of Sec.
35-1-42. If the Appellant is deemed an employee of
this State, then his exclusive remedy is "Workmen's Compensation.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Sommerville
v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718
(1948):
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the crucial factor in determining whether an applicant
for workmen's compensation is an employee or
an independent contractor is whether or not the
person for whom the services were performed
had the right to control the execution of the work.
196 P.2d at 720.
To the same effect are: Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 (1946); Luker Sand
and Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188,
23 P.2d 225 (1933); Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 183 (1935); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 223,
365 P.2d 1020 (1961).
The Appellant alleges that the Industrial Commission inspectors and the Road Commission personnel not
only had the authority to dictate the manner in which
the work of Cox Construction Company would be con19
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ducted, but also had the duty to do so. He urges that
the State, through its Eoad Commission and Industrial
Commission agents, should not have permitted the Cox
Construction Company to pour cement under the power
line with the assistance of a boom crane, should not
have permitted the operation of the crane without an
observer, and should not have continued work until the
power line had been de-energized.
It should be noted that operating a crane under a
power line is permissible under the safety regulations
promulgated by the Industrial Commission and the Highway Department if ten (10) feet of clearance is maintained. Thus, the contractor could properly and safely
operate the crane in connection with the pour if the
minimum was maintained. '
^
The authority to supervise the specific manner in
which work was to be performed relied upon by the
Appellant is the precise factor which precludes a recovery against the State. As the Court in Parkinson v.
Industrial Commission, 110 Utah 309,172 P.2d 136 (1946)
stated:
It is when the employer cannot only determine
*•*
where the work shall be done but how it shall be
executed that the relationship is that of employeremployee. 172 P.2d at 140.
Thus, the instant case is identical to that of Stevens
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron, 24 Utah 2d 214, 469 P.2d 3
(1970). In Stevens, the plaintiff was an employee of a
contractor engaged in work on the defendant's property. He claimed that the defendant had a "duty to
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inspect and make safe the places where men work" and
that the duty extended to employees of contractors. 469
P.2d at 4. The Court held no relationship existed between the parties giving rise to an affirmative duty to
protect the plaintiff because he was an employee of an
independent contractor. The Court noted, however, that
the plaintiff's cause of action was barred nevertheless,
because, if the defendant had a duty to supervise the
plaintiff's activity, the defendant became an employer
and Workmen's Compensation was the exclusive remedy
against him.
The Appellant's claim is also barred as a matter
of law because the actions of any State employee that
may have contributed to the accident would have been
undertaken as a co-employee and not as a third person
against whom recovery may be sought. Since the plaintiff applied for and has received an award paid pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act, a suit may
be brought only in accordance with (Sec. 35-1-62, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, which states, in its relevant part:
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this title shall have been
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another
person, not in the same employment, the injured
employee . . . may also have an action for damages against such third person. (Emphasis added).
In Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997
(1972), this Court set forth the guidelines for determining whether or not employees are engaged in the
same employment within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-62.
21
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In Peterson, the plaintiff's deceased was an employee
of a general contractor killed when the scaffolding upon
which he was standing collapsed. Plaintiff brought suit
against an independent contractor that had negligently
maintained the scaffolding claiming that the defendant
was a "person not in the same employment." Affirming the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant, the Court held that the relationship between the
parties was such that they were fellow servants and
thus persons in the same employment. The Court set
forth the following test for determining when persons
are in the same employment within the meaning of Sec.
35-1-62:
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged in
the same line of work and labor together in such
personal relations that they can exercise an influence upon each other promotive of proper caution and respect of their mutual safety. They
should be at the time of the injury directly operating with each other in the particular business
at hand, or they must be operating so that mutual
duties bring them into such co-association that
they may exercise an influence upon each other
to use proper caution and be so situated in their
labor to some extent as to be able to supervise
and watch the conduct of each other as to skill,
diligence, and carefulness. When workmen are
so engaged, we think they are working in the same
employment. 493 P.2d at 1000.
The fact that the relationship between employees is
merely temporary will not prevent them from being in
the same employment, if the accident occurred while
they were engaged in the same project. See, e.g., Barnes
v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 520 P.2d 877 (Utah 1974).
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In the instant case, Appellant argues that State
employees had an opportunity to supervise and watch
the conduct of the crane operator as to skill, diligence
and carefulness and, yet, failed to exercise their influence upon him to use proper caution. But, as this Court
recognized in Peterson* v. Fowler, supra, "When workers
are so engaged they are working in the same employment" and all separate actions are expressly prohibited.
493 P.2d at 1000.
The Appellant's own contentions place this action
squarely within the cagetory of cases barred by the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Consequently, this Court
should affirm the judgment of the Court below.
POINT III
THE NEGLIGENCE OF COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY CONSTITUTES THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF APPELLANT'S INJURIES.
Appellant's claim against the State of Utah is
founded upon the contention that the State passively
stood by when the danger of contact with the high voltage wire became foreseeable. Even assuming the validity of Appellant's argument, the undisputed facts clearly
demonstrate that the active negligence of the crane operator constitutes the sole proximate cause of the accident terminating any passive negligence of the State
of Utah as a legal cause of the accident.
In Kimiho Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah
2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961), this Court upheld a di-
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rected verdict dismissing the plaintiff's claim in a situation identical to the instant case. In Kimiko Torna, a
workman was electrocuted when a crane boom made
electrical contact with a power line during a cement
pouring operation. The plaintiff sued the power company for failing to inspect the construction area and to
either deactivate or remove the power lines.
The Court recognized that the power company officials had a duty to keep themselves informed of the progress of the construction work because it was foreseeable
that an accident could occur. Unless the possibility of electrocution by contact with the wire could have been foreseen, no duty would have existed to inspect the premises and to alleviate the danger by terminating or insulating electrical power for the cement pour. The Court
stated:
It was the duty of the defendant under existing
circumstances to exercise a high degree of care
to maintain its wires in such condition and in
such a way as to avoid accidents. A high degree
of foresight is required because of the character
and behavior of electricity which it sells.
It is our conclusion the Utah Power & Light Co.
would have the obligation to keep themselves informed generally of changing conditions and circumstances. 365 P.2d at 792. (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding the actual foreseeability of the danger of contact with the wire, the Court held that the
subsequent active negligence of the crane operator by
proceeding in the face of such a known danger is not
legally foreseeable. Consequently, the passive negligence
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of the power company was terminated as a legal cause
of the accident because the subsequent active negligence
constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Placing sole responsibility for the accident upon the construction company, this Court stated:
Thus, even though the Utah Power & Light Co.
had negligently created a dangerous situation,
and negligently continued to maintain such a condition by refusing to cut off the power, the Mountain States Construction Company did have
knowledge of such condition and failed to avoid
the impending disaster. On the contrary the Mountain States Construction Company put into motion the actions which created the accident. Id.
at 794.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the crane
operator, as well as the construction supervisor on the
site, had actual knowledge of the condition and failed
to avoid the impending accident. On two occasions just
minutes before the accident occurred, the crane operator
was warned of the danger and was asked to move away
from the wire. [Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8]. This is not
a case where the construction company failed to discover the hazard in in time to avoid it. To the contrary,
Appellant concedes that the construction company knew
of the imminent danger posed by the high voltage line
and, yet, inexplicably proceeded in disregard of the peril.
It is that action that is legally unforeseeable and terminates all prior passive negligence.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Kimiko Toma by
arguing that facts may exist supporting his belief that
proceeding in the fact of such danger may have been
25
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foreseeable. In so doing, he fails to recognize that, as
a matter of law, and therefore irrespective of such facts,
it is never legally foreseeable that a person having knowledge of imminent peril will fail to avoid it when he has
a reasonable opportunity to do so.
The facts of the instant case clearly place the Appellant's claim squarely within the rule set forth in
Komiko Toma. The trial court clearly did not err in
holding, as a matter of law, that the State cannot be
liable for the injuries suffered by this Appellant. Consequently, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
court below.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the summary judgment in
favor of the State of Utah because the Road Commission and the Industrial Commission owed no legal duty
to the Appellant, because the Workmen's Compensation
Act precludes the Appellant's asserted claim and the
negligence of the Appellant's employer constitutes the
sole proximate cause of his injuries.
Respectfully submitted,
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